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Testing the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem: 






The paper explores the long-run relationship between government domestic borrowing and 
private savings for a small EU country. It represents an attempt to assess the relevance of 
Ricardian Equivalence in Greece. The empirical findings are that in accordance to the Ricardian 
Equivalence theorem prediction, government borrowing in Greece leads to an increase in 
household savings. However, the increased private savings do not completely offset increased 
government debt. In other words, contrary to the Ricardian Equivalence theorem, households to 
some extent perceive government bonds as net wealth and consequently increased their 
consumption. This behaviour can be thought as being the result of liquidity constraints faced by 





The issue of how fiscal policy affects the macro-economy has for long divided the 
economics profession. In particular, of great importance is the impact, if any, of government 
debt on savings. The Public debt neutrality, usually called Ricardian Equivalence, has been 
one of the most debated issues of modern macroeconomics and the subject of a large number 
of theoretical and empirical studies (Kormendi and Meguire (1983, 1995), Blanchard (1985), 
Barth  et al.  (1986), Bernheim and Bagwell (1988), Evans (1988, 1993), Barro  (1989), 
Feldstein and Elmendorf (1990), Bohn (1992), Graham (1995), Becker (1997)).   
Three alternative ways (or a mix of those) can finance government spending: raising 
taxes, printing money or borrowing. Assume that the government chooses to finance its 
increased spending by borrowing and thus holds tax rates and money supply unaltered.
1 The 
crucial question is if there is any effect of such a policy on national saving, and if indeed 
there is one, what it is. This question is widely known as whether government bonds 
represent net wealth (Barro (1974)). In essence, the main idea of the Ricardian Equivalence 
proposition asserts that public debt and lump sum taxes are equivalent methods of financing 
a given amount of public expenses. In other words, it is government spending that matters 
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not the method of financing it. This public expense financing irrelevance is an extension, 
applied to the public sector, of the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller 
(1958)). 
By virtue of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, Government bonds do not represent 
net wealth therefore household savings will increase to offset the government policy. The 
argument, well established in the literature, is that while government bonds represent an asset 
to those holding them, they represent a liability to taxpayers that must redeem them in a 
future date (Poterba and Summers (1987), Seater (1993)).   
In fact, since the assets at the same time are liabilities as well, it must be the case that 
increased saving must exactly match government borrowing. Households, by recognising 
that the government must satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint anticipate that the 
current increase in wealth will be cancelled out by the future increase in taxes and therefore 
offset it in present value. As a result the households’ consumption path is not modified and 
the current ‘extra’ wealth is saved in order to provide the funds for paying the higher future 
taxes. Thus, the issuing of government debt to finance a fiscal imbalance represents not a 
reduction in the tax burden but merely a postponement of it. Consumers discounting the 
future understand that their total tax burden is not affected, therefore there is no reason to 
respond to the tax cut by increasing consumption. Instead, they will save the entire tax cut to 
meet the future tax liability; as a result, the decrease in public saving (the budget deficit) will 
coincide with an increase in private saving of precisely the same size (Elmendorf and 
Mankiw (1998)). 
If however it is the case that government bonds do represent net wealth then there 
should be an indirect adverse effect on savings through increased consumption of 
households.
2 How can one justify the idea that government bonds are net wealth? Bonds are 
net wealth to the extent that the asset of current generations is matched by a liability of future 
generations (Modigliani  (1961), Diamond (1965), Detken (1999)). However, if households 
have infinite horizons, for instance through intergenerational linkages, then intergenerational 
transfers (bequests) offset burdens shifted to future generations.   
The present paper will f ocus on the case of the Greek economy that is traditionally 
characterised by a high government debt
3 and also has a number of structural characteristics 
that are almost unique. The Greek case is interesting since, apart from being a member of the 
EU, it lies on the borderline between developed and emerging economies.   
In particular, the paper will test the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem for the Greek 
economy by exploring the dynamic link between domestic government borrowing and 
private sector savings. Furthermore, an attempt will be made to quantify the long-run impact 
in the quest of producing a complete characterisation of the underlying mechanism. The 
research questions will be addressed in a dynamic context by the use of time series techniques. 
Thus, the paper contributes to the existing empirical literature in the following ways. 
Firstly, it offers a case study on the relevance of Ricardian Equivalence for a small EU 
country, Greece. Secondly, by employing time series techniques (cointegration) it takes into 
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account the dynamic properties of the variables and explores the issue in an intertemporal 
framework. Thirdly, by recognizing that fiscal policy is not simply an economic 
phenomenon but also has a political dimension, the testing procedure controls for changes in 
the political environment by introducing dummy variables identifying changes in regimes.
4 
In this way the inference is not contaminated from government-specific policies. 
Furthermore, the significance of the coefficients related to the dummies will signal that 
indeed the underlying relationship between government borrowing and private savings is 
affected by the economic policies pursued by the political forces in power. The paper is 
organized as follows. Section II discusses the econometric methodology employed. Section 
III presents the data used. Section IV summarizes the empirical findings of the paper. Finally, 
Section V concludes. 
 
II. Data Issues 
 
The unavailability of comprehensive and complete data for savings led to using as a 
proxy private sector bank deposits. The same problem was encountered with public debt, 
which led to the use of government borrowing as a proxy. The choice of proxies is justified 
on the basis that domestic borrowing is part of the change in debt and therefore highly 
correlated with it. The same holds for household savings and bank deposits. For the period 
considered households held the bulk of their savings in the form of bank deposits, since the 
stock market was not developed enough and also savings in the form of foreign assets was 
virtually non-existent. 
The data consist of quarterly observations on real government domestic borrowing (B) 
and real private sector bank deposits which will be used as a proxy for savings (S). Both 
series are seasonally adjusted using the U.S. Bureau of the Census X-11 (additive) method. 
The nominal series have been expressed in real terms by using the Consumer Price Index (in 
1990 prices) in order to avoid inflation-dependent results and also correct for the business 
cycle. The data span the period from 1981:1 to 1996:3 and are taken from the IFS CD-ROM. 
 
III. Econometric Methodology 
 
The present study is an attempt to test the Ricardian Equivalence (RE hereafter) for the 
Greek economy. The variables under scrutiny are the real domestic government borrowing 
and real private savings. Domestic government borrowing (as opposed to total borrowing) is 
used in order to focus on the effect on the saving behaviour of households. That is, by 
ignoring external borrowing one can solely measure the effect on behaviour of domestic 
households. 
One of the testable hypotheses of the RE is that increased private savings will match 
government borrowing (increase in debt). In other words, the extra wealth in the form of 
bonds held by households will be transformed into savings. The operational hypothesis tested 
here will be that there should be a positive relationship between government domestic 
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borrowing and private savings. Finding a positive relationship will provide evidence in 
favour of the RE. If in contrast there is evidence for a negative relationship that will 
constitute a prima facie rejection of the RE. 
The time series of the macroeconomic variables involved in the subsequent analysis 
are non-stationary
5 therefore the appropriate econometric framework should take into 
account this property. Thus, the dynamic link between government borrowing and savings 
will be explored within a possibly cointegrated system where effectively the joint 
endogeneity of the variables is allowed. 
Cointegration
6 of a vector of variables implies that the number of unit roots in the 
system is less than the number of unit roots in the corresponding univariate series (Granger 
(1981), Granger and Weiss (1983), Granger (1986), Engle and Granger (1987)).   
In order to test whether the government borrowing and savings are cointegrated the 
Johansen procedure will be employed (Johansen (1988), Johansen (1991), Johansen (1995)). 
The  Johansen procedure  starts with the definition of an n -dimensional vector of 
non-stationary variables  X, which potentially form a cointegrating set. The Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) representation of the unrestricted system with Gaussian error u (the 
intercept terms are omitted for simplicity) is: 
 
t k t k t t t u × A ... × A × A × + + + + = - - - 2 2 1 1                                       (1) 
 
where  ) , 0 ( ~ S N ut                                                         (2) 
 
and Xt is (n x 1 ) and each of the Ai is an (n x n ) matrix of parameters. Model (1) can be 
reformulated into a Vector Error Correction (VECM) form: 
 
  u X X Ã ... X Ã X Ã X t k t k t k t t t + - + + + = - - - - - - P D D D D 1 1 2 2 1 1                          (3) 
 
where  1 2 1 ) ( 1 - = - - - - = ,...,k ,   i            A ... A I i i G                                 (4) 
 
and  ) ( 1 k A ... A I - - - - = P                                                  (5) 
 
The rank of matrix  P  determines whether there are a ny significant cointegrating 
vectors between the variables. Clearly if the rank of  P  is zero the matrix is null and (3) is 
just a VAR model in first differences. The other extreme case is when  P  has full column 
rank, which is equivalent to the stationarity of the vector process. The intermediate case of 
reduced column rank implies that there exist stationary linear combinations of the variables, 
corresponding to the cointegration vectors. Furthermore, Johansen has developed a sequence 
of Likelihood Ratio tests to test for the number of the cointegration vectors (or equivalently 
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the rank of  P ) the so-called trace test (denoted by  tr l ) and the maximum eigenvalue test 
denoted by  max l ). In particular, to decide on the number of the cointegration vectors the 
maximum eigenvalue test will be used, since  max l  has a sharper alternative and thus it is 
preferred to the trace test.  Critical values obtained from Monte Carlo simulations of the 
limiting distribution are given in Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
To explore the dynamic link between government borrowing and domestic savings the 
order of integration of the series has to be established. For that reason, the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test was employed (Dickey and Fuller  (1979, 1981)). The 
following table reports the results for the tests. 
 




t-statistic (lag order) 
Real Domestic Government Borrowing (level)  1.18 (2) 
Real Private Bank Deposits (level)    1.66 (3) 
Real Domestic Government Borrowing (difference)  5.61 (2) 
Real Private Bank Deposits (difference)    7.23 (2) 
* Critical value at the 5% significance level is  2.89. 
 
Both series seem to be I(1) in levels so the necessary condition for cointegration 
among them is satisfied. The next step was to employ the Johansen method in order to test 
whether the series constitute a cointegrated system. The following table summarises the 
cointegration statistics. 
 
Table 2    Cointegration Results 
Panel A. Cointegration Results (1981:1 - 1996:3) 









r = 0  r = 1  15.9
*  15.67  13.75 
r = 1  r = 2  00.85  9.24  7.52 
Panel B. Error Correction Mechanism 
ECM = S  0.068
*B  1.88 
( 2.47)    ( 3.76) 
Panel C. Multivariate Diagnostics 
p-val 
LM(14)  0.17 
LM(1)  0.14 
a. The estimation was based on a VECM of lag order four (chosen by the Schwarz criterion), including a restricted 
constant and two dummies for the different political parties in power.   
b. The asterisk denotes significance at the 5% level. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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The model was estimated by using four lags, including a restricted drift term. The 
choice of the lag length was based on the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (Schwarz  (1978)). 
Alternative lag structures were considered but results were insensitive to the particular 
choice of lag length. However, at this lag order the residual vectors from the system satisfied 
the no-autocorrelation assumption, which is a critical assumption in the Johansen procedure. 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, to avoid regime-specific results dummies will be included 
in order to capture differences in economic policy. In particular, dummy ND takes the value 
1 when the conservative party (New Democracy) was in power between 1990:Q1 until 
1993:Q3, and zero otherwise. Similarly, dummy PSK takes the value of 1 when the socialist 
party (PASOK) was in power between 1981:Q1 to 1989:Q4, 1993:Q4 to 1996:Q3, and zero 
otherwise. 
The maximum eigenvalue test statistic suggests that the cointegration rank of the 
system is equal to one. The null of no cointegration is rejected at the 5% significance level, 
whereas the null that the rank of the cointegration space is equal to one is not rejected. This 
provides evidence that government borrowing and private savings are tied together by one 
long run relationship or equivalently that they share a common stochastic trend. To be more 
precise there is evidence for the presence of a unique statistical equilibrium, which works as 
an ‘attractor’ for the variables. The estimated long-run equilibrium relationship (EQ) had the 
following form (t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
  .   B .    S  EQ  878 1 068 0
* - - =                                            (6) 
( 2.47) ( 3.76) 
 
The long run relationship as it stands allows one to test for the Ricardian Equivalence. 
Recall that according to the RE the long-run impact of government borrowing on savings 
should be positive. Additionally, strictly speaking the long run impact should equal unity. In 
other words, rational forward-looking agents increase their savings on-to-one with any 







                                                             (7) 
 
The estimated long run impact took the following form (d-hat denotes the estimated long-run 
‘derivative’): 
 
) 0275 . 0 . (





                                                       (8) 
 
Thus, according to the i nformation in the sample used, government borrowing is indeed 
associated with a long-run increase in savings. However, the null that the long-run impact is 
unity (or equivalently that the elements of the cointegration vector are symmetric) can be 
rejected at all conventional levels of significance. This suggests that, to some extent, agents 
perceive government debt (government bonds) as net wealth and consequently do not DRAKOS: TESTING THE RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE THEOREM 
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increase their savings in such a way as to counteract public borrowing. In fact, the coefficient 
of government borrowing in the long run relationship can be interpreted as the long-run 
marginal propensity to save out of increased wealth induced by holding government debt 
(bonds). The marginal propensity to save was found to be approximately 7%, that is in the 
long run the effect of government borrowing is to increase household savings by this fraction, 
which ultimately is translated into increased household consumption (93% of the ‘extra’ 
wealth acquired is channelled to consumption). 
Furthermore, another useful metric that would shed more light in the long-run 
relationship describing the time paths of the variables is the long-run elasticity of private 
savings with respect to government borrowing. This is (the ordering of variables in subscript 
denotes that we calculate the elasticity of savings with respect to borrowing):
7 
 






= e                                                         (9) 
 
Since we are dealing with time series, although the long-run impact (the derivative) is a 
constant, the elasticity depends on the levels assumed by the variables and for that reason is 
time-dependent. Therefore, one cannot use a unique point estimate for the elasticity but only 
observe the value it attains at specific points in time. Alternatively one may want to see how 
the elasticity behaves across time. The following table summarises the point estimate of the 
elasticity for various points in the sample. 
 
Table 3   Savings Long-Run Elasticity
* 
Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum 
0.17  0.149  0.74  0.004 
*  Elasticity calculated at the mean, median, max and min of the ratio B/S multiplied by the long-run marginal 
propensity to dissave as in equation 4 in main text. 
 
One way to interpret this metric is that the elasticity denotes the percentage of 
government borrowing that is perceived by households as representing net wealth in 
particular points in time. For instance, across the time span considered in the analysis, 
households’ behaviour indicates that on average  17% ( t-stat.  =  10.6) of government 
borrowing has been thought as representing net wealth.   
The following table reports the estimation results for the VECM and also a set of 
diagnostics. 
Tests for Weak Exogeneity
8 (significance of speed of adjustment to deviations from 
equilibrium) also reveal that government borrowing is weakly exogenous whereas private   
 
7. We acknowledge an anonymous referee for suggesting an alternative way of calculating the elasticity. Essentially, 
one can base the elasticity on the long run components extracted from the variables using the common trend 
representation from the estimated VECM. 
8. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. However, in accordance with the existing empirical literature 
we continue to use the term ‘Weak Exogeneity’ in a rather more flexible and somewhat informal way. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Table 4   VECM Estimation Results 
Equation for Real Private Bank Deposits (S)
a 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic
b 
Ä(S)( 1)  0.03  0.15 
Ä(S)( 2)  0.03  0.27 
Ä(S)( 3)  0.32  2.17 
Ä(S)( 4)  0.07  0.66 
Ä(B)( 1)  0.02  1.04 
Ä(B)( 2)  6.32E 05  0.002 
Ä(B)( 3)  0.009  0.47 
Ä(B)( 4)  0.02  1.37 
ECM( 1)  0.5  3.16 
ND
c  0.33  3.31 
PSK  0.25  2.71 
Diagnostics 
R
2  0.54 
Adjusted R
2  0.44 
Serial Correlation LM(4)  (p-val) 0.19 
ARCH LM(4)Test:  (p-val) 0.022 
Equation for Real Government Domestic Borrowing (B) 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Ä(S)( 1)  0.61  0.32 
Ä(S)( 2)  0.51  0.37 
Ä(S)( 3)  2.00  1.68 
Ä(S)( 4)  2.78  2.95 
Ä(B)( 1)  0.79  7.80 
Ä(B)( 2)  0.95  4.99 
Ä(B)( 3)  0.39  1.94 
Ä(B)( 4)  0.26  1.80 
ECM( 1)  1.56  1.23 
ND  0.98  0.93 
PSK  1.47  2.15 
Diagnostics 
R
2  0.59 
Adjusted R
2  0.51 
Serial Correlation LM(4)  0.08 
ARCH LM(4)Test:  0.97 
a. Ä stands for the difference operator.   
b. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) t-statistics. 
c. ND and PSK dummies for New Democracy and PASOK governments respectively. DRAKOS: TESTING THE RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE THEOREM 
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savings are not. However, some caution is needed when using the term Weak Exogeneity 
since the two VECM equations do not constitute the ‘mean’ equations of the conditional and 
the marginal distributions (because among other issues, the covariance of the error terms is 
not necessarily zero). Based on the coefficients of the error correction terms it is not strictly 
valid to refer to Weak Exogeneity in the Engle et al. (1983) sense. Thus bearing this in mind, 
private savings seem to respond to systemic shocks and change in order to ‘drive’ the system 
back to equilibrium. So, private savings act as receptor of the shock and in a sense absorb it 
so as to eliminate the realised equilibrium error.   
Given the evidence against the Ricardian Equivalence, one has to identify the 
assumptions that are likely to be violated. For that reason, recall that the debt neutrality is 
achieved under the following conditions: 
 
Intergenerational altruism (bequests), 
No capital market imperfections (households do not face liquidity constraints), 
Households can accurately forecast their future income, 
Public debt must be ultimately repaid with the receipts from taxes of the next periods (the 
government satisfies its intertemporal budget constraint),   
Taxes are lump sum and non-distortionary.   
 
The negative long-run impact of the budgetary policy (government borrowing) on 
private savings signals that one or more of the above assumptions is violated. First, it could 
be the case that some households are liquidity constrained. As a result, changes in 
government debt policies that effectively allow consumers to borrow by deferring taxes may 
affect their consumption. In particular, when liquidity constraints arise due to adverse 
selection then Ricardian Equivalence may be invalidated (Yotsuzuka (1987), Rockerbie 
(1997)). Furthermore, if the liquidity constraints arise from limitations on the set of debt 
contracts that the government will enforce, then the RE is likely to fail.   
A second possible explanation is that households may exhibit ‘myopic’ behaviour. 
That is they may fail to project the path of their future income and also may fail to take into 
account future tax liabilities. Essentially, instead of solving their ‘dynamic optimisation 
problem’ by using all available information and discount future properly, they resort to ‘rules 
of thumb’ that lead them to consume a higher fraction of their disposable income than the 
solution of the dynamic optimisation would suggest.   
A third possibility is that the non-lump-sum character of taxes could cause departures 
from RE (Barsky et al. (1986)).   
The fourth possibility is that the configuration of growth and interest rates is such that 
the government need never raise future taxes to pay for increases in its indebtedness. 
Basically, this would be the case when the steady state growth rate is in excess of the steady 
state rate of interest. In such a case, households will treat part of the government debt as net 
wealth and consequently will reduce their savings. 
As far as the Greek economy is concerned, the empirical finding is most likely to be 
the result of the combined presence of the first two possibilities. The third possibility is not 
theoretically robust (Chan (1983), Poterba and Summers (1987)). The fourth possibility is 
irrelevant for the Greek case since the observed growth has consistently fallen short of the JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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rate of interest in the economy. On the other hand, the first two possibilities are highly 
consistent with stylised facts in the Greek economy. For the period under scrutiny the Greek 
financial markets did not exhibit sufficient ‘depth’ and also the liberalisation process was 
slow. Furthermore, uncertainty regarding the future path of income and especially taxes was 
high. In particular, it is an anecdotal fact that frequent legislative changes in taxation have 
increased uncertainty. 
 
V. Conclusion   
 
An implication of Ricardian Equivalence was tested  for the Greek economy. In 
particular, the hypothesis tested was that fiscal imbalances financed by debt are matched by 
an increase in household savings. By employing the Johansen procedure to accommodate for 
the time series properties of the series, the paper explored the qualitative and quantitative 
impact of government borrowing on private sector bank deposits. The empirical findings 
were that increases in government debt are associated with household increased saving, 
albeit far from being a one-to-one e ffect, providing evidence against the Ricardian 
Equivalence theorem. In other words, households perceive government debt as net wealth 
and therefore consume part of it. The estimation indicated that households’ long-run 
marginal propensity to save as a result of increased debt is approximately 7%.   
Furthermore, the mean elasticity of private bank deposits with respect to government 
borrowing was found to be approximately  17%. That is, for the period considered, 
government borrowing has increased private savings by an average of 17%.   
A number of possible explanations have been offered that could account for a negative 
impact of government borrowing on savings. As far as the Greek case is concerned, 
reasonable explanations seem to be that the private sector is liquidity constrained and/or also 
exhibiting ‘myopic’ behaviour. 
The policy implication is the following. To the extent that private sector bank deposits 
are used to finance private sector investment, the negative impact of government borrowing 
on it will result, at least partially, in a ‘crowding-out’ effect. Private investment will be 
adversely affected either by facing a higher cost of borrowing (shortage of available funds in 
the capital market ‘pushing’ up the rate of interest) or by some kind of credit rationing 
(where a smaller fraction of private projects will be financed). In either case, the reduced 
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